INTRODUCTION
Convex coalitional games were introduced by Shapley [25] . They include in particular any convex function of a measure and occur in many applications.
article no. ET972304 For example, it was shown in [28] that the coalitional game modeling a producer and a set of potential consumers under decreasing costs is convex. The airport game [21, Section XI.4] and the bankruptcy game [3] are also convex. Several examples of convex games which arise from public good models were given in [7] . The core of a convex game with a finite set of players was studied in [25] and other solution concepts were investigated in [19] . In this work we study the equivalence between the core, von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets, and the Mas Colell bargaining set in convex coalitional games over a measurable space of players.
Stable sets for cooperative games were introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in their seminal book [29] . It was shown in [25] that the core of a finite convex game is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set. The result was extended to cooperative games without side payments in [22] . Stable sets for coalitional games with a finite set of players have been studied intensively (for a comprehensive survey see [17] ). There are a few works concerning stable sets of games with an infinite set of players.
Results from [4] on stable sets of symmetric simple games were extended in [5] to games with a continuum of players. Stable sets of market games with a continuum of players were studied in [15] . It was shown in [9] that the core of a non-atomic glove market game which is defined as the minimum of a finite number of non-atomic probability measures is a stable set. Such a game is usually not convex. The stability of the core in games with a countable set of players was studied in [10] . The core of games with an infinite set of players was investigated in many works (for a comprehensive survey see [16] ). In this work we show that the core of a continuous convex game with a measurable space of players is its unique von Neumann Morgenstern stable set.
The first definition of a bargaining set for cooperative games was given by Aumann and Maschler [2] . Recently, several new concepts of bargaining sets have been introduced [8, 13, 14 and 20] ; for a comprehensive survey see [18] . All these sets contain the core of the game. However, there are important cases in which some of these sets coincide with the core. It is known that for convex coalitional games with a finite set of players these sets coincide with the core [8, 14, and 19] . The equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games was studied in [11] . The Mas Colell bargaining set was introduced in [20] , where it was proved that in an atomless pure exchange economy it coincides with the set of competitive equilibria (and hence, by Aumann's [1] equivalence theorem, it also coincides with the core). It was shown in [26] that for a large class of both finite and mixed market games the Mas Colell bargaining set coincides with the core. In this work we extend the definition of the Mas Colell bargaining set to coalitional games with transferable utility which have a measurable space of players, and prove that for continuous convex games the core coincides with the set of countably additive measures in the bargaining set. We give an example which shows that the continuity assumption is essential. We also give an example which shows that the bargaining set of an infinite continuous convex game may contain non-countably additive measures, and thus may strictly include the core.
The class of games to which our results apply is very general and includes, in particular, games with a finite set of players, games with countably many players, non-atomic games, and mixed games. The known proofs of the corresponding results for finite games do not seem to admit an extension to games with a measurable space of players. Our approach is different, and thus in particular provides new proofs in the finite case. Our proofs employ Delbaen's [6] characterization of convex games, Schmeidler's [24] characterization of convex games in terms of the Choquet integral, and a general minmax theorem due to Sion [27] .
DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
Let (T, 7) be a measurable space, i.e., T is a set and 7 is a _-field of subsets of T. We refer to the members of T as players and to those of 7 as coalitions. A coalitional game, or simply a game on (T, 7), is a function &: 7 Ä R + with &(<)=0. A game & on (T, 7) is continuous at S # 7 if for all sequences S 1 S 2 } } } of coalitions such that n=1 S n =S, and all sequences S 1 $S 2 $ } } } of coalitions such that n=1 S n =S, we have
Observe that if 7 is finite then continuity is satisfied automatically.
A
whenever A and B are disjoint coalitions in 7. It is convex if
for every A, B # 7. Clearly, a convex game is superadditive. We note that by [23, Proposition 3.15] a convex game which is continuous at the grand coalition is continuous at every coalition.
We denote by ba=ba(T, 7) the Banach space of all bounded finitely additive measures on (T, 7) with the variation norm. If + is a countably additive measure on (T, 7) we denote by ba(+)=ba(T, 7, +) the subspace of ba which consists of all bounded finitely additive measures on (T, 7) which vanish on the +-measure zero sets in 7. The subspace of ba which consists of all bounded countably additive measures on (T, 7) is denoted by ca=ca(T, 7). If + is a measure in ca then ca(+)=ca(T, 7, +) denotes the set of all members of ca which are absolutely continuous with respect to +. Finally, for a subset A of an ordered vector space, we denote by A + the set of all nonnegative members of A.
A It is well known that the core of a convex game is non-empty (see [25] for finite games and [23] for games with a measurable space of players).
We proceed with some definitions leading to the concept of von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets. In all these definitions, we assume that & is a superadditive game on (T, 7). For any coalition S # 7, we define
where the infimum is taken over all countable partitions S 1 , S 2 , ... of S such that S i # 7 for all i. It is easy to verify, using superadditivity, that We come now to the definition of a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set:
Let & be a superadditive game on (T, 7). A set V I(&) is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set (or simply a stable set) of the game & if:
Our first result is:
Theorem A. Let & be a continuous convex game on (T, 7). Then the core of & is its unique von Neumann Morgenstern stable set.
For finite games, this result was proved by Shapley [25] . A version of this result for games with countably many players was proved by Einy and Shitovitz [10] . Their assumptions on the field of coalitions 7 were different from those made here, and hence their result is not implied by Theorem A, but it also does not imply Theorem A in the countable case.
We now give a definition of the Mas Colell bargaining set, which extends the definition given in [20] for finite games. For this definition, the game & need not be superadditive.
Let & be a game on (T, 7) and ! # ba be a payoff measure in &. An objection to ! is a pair (A, ') such that A # 7 and ' # ba satisfy '(A) &(A), '(A)>!(A) and '(B) !(B) for all B # 7 with B/A. A counter objection to the objection (A, ') is a pair (C,`) such that:
(1) C # 7,`# ba and`(C) &(C). 
We come now to our second result.
Theorem B. Let & be a continuous convex game on (T, 7). Then
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem B.
Corollary B. Let 7 be finite, and let & be a convex game on (T, 7). Then
Core(&)=MB(&).
Note that if T is finite and 7 is the set of all subsets of T, then this result was proved by Dutta, Ray, Sengupta and Vohra [8, Proposition 3.3] .
The following example shows that the continuity assumption in Theorems A and B cannot be removed. 
Now it is easy to construct a counter objection of the form (A"[i],`) to (A, '), and thus ! # MB(&).
The following example shows that for infinite games the bargaining set may strictly include the core even when the game is continuous and convex, and thus the restriction to countably additive measures in Theorem B is necessary. Then F is a filter in 7. Let F 0 be a maximal filter which contains F. Define a measure ! on 7 by !(S)=1 if S # F 0 and !(S)=0 otherwise. We show that ! # MB(&). Let (A, ') be an objection to !. Then A{T. Let i # T "A.
Since !([i])=0 and &([i])>0, ([i], &) is a counter objection to (A, '), and thus ! # MB(&).

PROOFS Let & be a game on (T, 7).
Observe that a null coalition is inessential, but not vice versa.
The following fact is a consequence of [23, Theorem 3.10] and is recorded here for later use. We state and prove now a lemma concerning continuous convex games which constitutes the main part of the proofs of our equivalence theorems. Proof. We need the following notation: If ! # ca and f is a !-integrable function then the integral T f d! will be denoted by !( f ).
Let + # ca + be a measure as guaranteed in Proposition 3.1. Let B be the unit ball of L (+)=L (T, 7, +). The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 
where the integral is a Riemann integral and is known as the Choquet integral of f with respect to &. In particular for each S # 7 we have &Ä (/ s )=&(S).
In Steps 2 5 we treat the special case when ! # ca + (+).
Step 2. We prove that &Ä &! attains a maximum on B + .
As Core(&) ca + (+), by the Radon Nikodym theorem for each`# Core(&) the function`( f )= T f d`is continuous on B + with respect to the weak*-topology which is induced by L (+) on B + . Therefore &Ä is weak*-upper semicontinuous on B + , as it is the minimum of weak*-continuous functions on B + . As ! # ca + (+), &Ä &! is a weak*-upper semicontinuous function on B + . Now by Alaoglu's theorem B + is compact in the weak*-topology. Therefore &Ä &! attains a maximum on B + .
Step 3. We prove that the maximum in Step 2 is attained at a coalition A.
It is clear that the coalition A found in Step 3 satisfies (3.1). Moreover, since &(S)>!(S), we have &(A)>!(A). It remains to find ' # Core(&) which satisfies (3.2).
Step 5. We prove that the order of the quantifiers in Step 6. We now show that if ! is in ca + but is not absolutely continuous with respect to +, then there exist A and ' such that (3.1) and (3.2) are satisfied. Step 7. We now assume that ! # ca is a signed measure, and show that there exist A and ' such that (3.1) and (3.2) are satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem A. It suffices to show that Core(&) is externally stable. Let + # ca + be a measure as guaranteed in Proposition 3.1. Let ! # I(&)"Core(&). Let S # 7 be such that !(S)<&(S).
We first assume that ! # ca + . Let =>0 be such that !(S)+=+(S)<&(S). We now assume that ! is in ba + but is not countably additive. By [30, Theorem 1.23], ! can be decomposed uniquely into a sum of a nonnegative countably additive measure ! c and a nonnegative purely finitely additive measure ! p . As + # ca + , by [30, Theorem 1.22] , there exists an increasing sequence of sets C n # 7 such that ! p (C n )=0 for all n, and lim n Ä +(T"C n )=0. Hence there is no counter objection of C to (A, '), and as C was arbitrary, (A, ') is a justified objection to !.
Q.E.D.
